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As nonprofit organizations, art museums are exempt from federal income
tax in the United States. This exemption does not mean that tax rules have no
effect on museums, however. Far from it. The various tax instruments affect
art museums indirectly but dramatically. They change the incentives of indi-
viduals and corporations to make donations of art, they change the relative
cost ofraising capital for museum projects, and they change the incentives of
museums to make passive investments in securities rather than active invest-
ments in unrelated businesses.
Tax policy provides an extra incentive to make charitable donations through
the deduction against income tax or estate tax for such gifts. At the current
top marginal, personal income-tax rate of 28 percent, a dollar gift only costs
the taxpayer 72 cents, because the government gives up 28 cents that might
otherwise be collected.
For art museums, a particularly important form ofdonation is artwork that
has appreciated in value since the time of acquisition by the donor. In this
case, the taxpayer may get a "double incentive." Itemizers are allowed a de-
duction against ordinary income for the whole value ofthe gift, and, in addi-
tion, the regular tax system forgoes capital gains tax on the appreciation.
Since the capital gains tax was raised by the 1986 Tax Reform Act to the
ordinary personal rate, this additional tax forgiveness has become more im-
portant for some.
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has a pamtmg now worth $10,000 that was purchased for $8,000. The
$10,000 deduction saves $2,800 of tax on ordinary income, and giving the
painting instead ofcash saves another $560 oftax on the capital gain (the 28-
percent rate on the $2,000 of appreciation). By saving $3360, under the reg-
ular tax, the donor only gives up $6640. Ifthe alternative is to sell this prop-
erty, we say that the price of a $1 dollar gift is only 66.4 cents. On the other
hand, the appreciation on donated property might make the taxpayer subject
to the "alternative minimum tax" (AMT), with more complicated rules as de-
scribed below.
For those ofus who have always lived with such a system, these rules may
seem like the logical consequence ofprivate giving to a public cause. The tax
base is supposed to reflect one's ability to pay, and charitable gifts reduce this
ability by reducing disposable income (Andrews 1972). In this view, the de-
duction is partofthe definition ofincome, rather than a special incentive. An
alternative view is that income before gifts is a proper measure ofcontrol over
resources and therefore represents one's ability to pay tax. Donors can be said
to feel just as much value from their gifts as from their other consumption
expenditures, orelse they would not give. They are buying privileges ofmem-
bership, a plaque on the donation, a little prestige, or at least some personal
satisfaction. There is no logical necessity to exempt gifts. This alternative
view implicitly underlies the government's estimates ofthe "tax expenditure"
budget, showing the amount of tax that would have been collected without
each such deduction. 1
Under either view, the tax system clearly provides more incentive for char-
itable gifts than if there were no deduction. If this incentive induces more
donations of art, then tax policy affects art museums. This paper will look at
measures ofthis incentive and its effect.
Similarly, the government does not tax the endowment income ofcharitable
organizations like museums. There is no explicit effect, either tax or subsidy.
However, taxes levied on the rest of the economy serve to raise the cost of
other activities relative to the cost ofmuseum activities. In this sense we say
that there is an "implicit subsidy." With limited economic resources to go
around, a tax system that discourages certain uses of resources necessarily
encourages other untaxed uses ofresources. The tax system thereby impacts
museums. I discuss these implicit subsidies, while the paper by Charles T.
Clotfelter (chap. 9 in this volume) discusses explicit government subsidies.
The next section provides an overview ofthe various forms ofindirect fed-
eral aid to art museums. It measures the rate of the implicit subsidy, and it
provides a rough calculation of the size ofthe tax expenditure. It briefly dis-
cusses the justifications for public support and provides empirical evidence on
willingness to pay.
1. At the U.S. Treasury Department, Neubig and 10ulfaian (1988) estimate that the total tax
expenditure for the charitable deduction would have been $16.45 billion in 1988 under the old
law, but it was reduced to $12.87 billion bythe lowerrates ofthe Tax Reform Act of 1986.197 Don Fullerton
These preliminaries accomplished, following sections attempt to document
the actual effects oftax policy on art museums. Section 8.3 discusses the tax
rules for individuals' gifts in other countries, provides a brief history ofrules
in the United States, and considers the recent reduction ofmarginal tax rates
and the inclusion of appreciated property in the alternative minimum tax. It
finds that the reduction ofrates in the 1986 Tax Reform Act may depress gifts
to art museums by as much as 24 percent. Section 8.4 analyzes incentives
provided by the income tax exemption and the unrelated business income tax.
Itfinds that the combination oftax advantages does reduce the cost ofcapital,
but the result is still not "unfair" to other businesses as long as the rules do
not change unexpectedly. This section also discusses rules for gifts ofart by
firms under the corporate income tax, and bequests ofart under the estate and
gift tax. A final section offers conclusions.
8.2 Implicit Subsidy and Tax Expenditure
A precise estimate ofthe implicit subsidy going to art museums is not pos-
sible, but a rough calculation indicates that the implicit federal tax advantages
may be larger than all other sources offederal aid. This section discusses the
rate of subsidy, the fraction ofmuseum funds from tax expenditure, the phil-
osophicaljustification for subsidy, and survey evidence on desires to subsidize
the arts.
8.2.1 The Rate ofImplicit Subsidy'
For some background information on those who give to the arts, consider
table 8.1. For each income group listed in column 1, the weighted average of
personal marginal tax rates is shown in column 2. Groups above $50,000 per
year are all near the top marginal rate, and column 3 shows that almost all of
these taxpayers itemize deductions and therefore receive an incentive for their
gifts. Column 4 shows the percent of gifts in each bracket that is property
rather than cash. The top income group gives up to 30percent in property, but
the relevant percentage for gifts to art museums may be even higher. Then,
column 5 shows that gifts to culture are very highly concentrated in the upper-
most income brackets-where taxpayers have high tax rates and itemize de-
ductions. Therefore gifts to the arts tend to receive a larger implicit subsidy
than most charitable gifts.
In the example above, at the 28-percentrate, the gift ofproperty had a price
of66.4 cents per dollar given. This example was chosen to be representative,
as can be seen in the last column of table 8.1. This column uses a general
formuladescribed ..later(appendixA,equation.[3l)...toaccount.for..giftsto ..cul-
ture in each rate bracket, with different percentages of the gift being appre-
ciated property. Since the overall average price is 67 cents per dollar given,
the tax expenditure is approximately one-third oftotal individual donations to
culture.
Of the private support to art museums, most comes from individuals. As198 Tax Policy Toward Art Museums
Table 8.1 Marginal Tax Rates and the Price ofGiving to the Arts
AGI Marginal Percent Percent Gifts to Price of
Group Tax Rate Itemizers Property Culture Giving
(I) (2) (3) (4) (S) (6)
D-lOK 2.0 S.l 8.4 .0 .98
ID-20K IS.9 20.S 8.7 .0 .83
2D-30K 17.9 43.1 8.5 .0 .81
3D-SOK 21.5 67.2 9.2 .0 .78
SD-7SK 27.8 8S.3 12.9 16.6 .70
7S-100K 29.1 8S.3 14.8 10.9 .69
1OD-2ooK 32.2 92.6 17.2 17.S .65
200K + 28.9 93.8 30.9 55.0 .67
Total 100.0 .67
Notes and sources (by column): (1) AGI = adjusted gross income, in K = thousands ofdollars;
(2) and (3) weighted average in each group, for the Tax Reform Act of 1986, from U.S. Treasury
Dept.; (4) Statistics of Income (SOl 1988), Internal Revenue Service, for tax year 1985 (before
appreciated property placed under the alternative minimum tax; (S) calculated from Clotfelter
(l98Sb, 213) and SOl for 1985; and (6) calculated from appendix equation (3) using column 2
for t and g, column 4 for (I - C), a = .S for the ratio of appreciation to value, and assuming
that the alternative is immediate consumption. These prices apply to itemizers, but there are very
few nonitemizers in the top few brackets with gifts to culture. See section 8.3.6, "Rate Reduction
and Giving to Art Museums."
described later in this paper, some gifts are from corporations that can take
deductions at their 34-percent rate. Some funds are received as bequests, de-
ducted at various estate-tax rates. For the rough calculations here, suppose
that the overall average ofthese implicit subsidy rates is about one-third. An-
other implicit subsidy to art museums is the nontaxation of investment in-
come. In this case the tax expenditure is measured relative to the other ex-
treme where that income also would have been taxed by one-third. A final
possible component of tax expenditure is the nontaxation of operating reve-
nues orearned income from admissions, sales, restaurants, parking, and other
fees.
8.2.2 An Estimate ofthe Tax Expenditure
Consider the following sources ofsupport in 1988 for the 155 art museums
surveyed in 1989 by the Association ofArt Museum Directors:
Operating revenue (earned income)
Private support (contributed income)
Value ofart donated
Total federal support

















Annual budgets of museums usually leave aside the value ofart that is do-
nated, since budgets are supposed to account only for dollar flows. These
donations represent additional assets to museums, however, and so they are
part of "economic" income. This art also receives an implicit subsidy. These
figures therefore show that 35.9 percent oftotal economic income is received
in donations ofcash and art.
With these figures, the tax expenditures can now be calculated. The deduc-
tions of gifts to art museums are worth about one-third of this 35.9 percent
figure, or about 12 percent ofeconomic income. The nontaxation ofendow-
ment income is worth another one-third of the 19.8 percent of income from
this source, or 6.6 percent ofeconomic income. A third form oftax expendi-
ture is the nontaxation of net operating revenues. Estimates are not available
here because the figures do not show all of the costs of the store, restaurant,
parking, or special events. In combination, however, justthe first two implicit
federal subsidies provide 18.6 percent of museum income, an amount sub-
stantially larger than the 11 percent coming from all other direct federal aid.
Since this direct federal spending includes the financing offive large govern-
ment museums (see Clotfelter, this volume), the implicit subsidy for private
museums must be much larger than direct spending.2
8.2.3 The Justification for Public Support
The purpose of this paper is to document the economic effects of tax rules
on art museums, but a discussion of the philosophical case for implicit or
explicit subsidies may help put these rules in perspective. Books have been
written on this subject (e.g., Netzer 1978; Banfield 1984; and Weisbrod
1988), so the discussion here will be brief.
The primary economic argument for providing a government subsidy to art
museums is that individuals should not be charged more for any service than
the cost of providing that service to the individual. In the case of museums,
the cost of an additional visitor may be very low most of the time, or essen-
tially zero. In this case, an admission fee might discourage visitors who could
benefit without imposing any costs. Economists say that the art museum is
"nonrival," in the sense that many can benefit without using it up. Equiva-
lently, we say that the cost of serving an incremental "customer" is less than
the average cost. Note, by the way, that visits during busy times orfor popular
exhibitions might well cause crowding, so an appropriate admission fee could
induce visitors to recognize the congestion costs they impose.
Ifvisitors during uncongested hours are not charged, however, and others
are charged only the incremental cost oftheir visits, then total revenue will be
........far lessthanthe totalcosLofoperatingthemuseum.Jnordertostayjnbusic
ness, the museum would need some support.
2. Perhaps due to recent rate reductions, the tax expenditure estimated here is smaller than the
estimate of Schuster (1986, 320) that "taxes forgone through various arts-related tax incentives
provide three times the amount ofdirect aid to the arts from all levels ofgovernment."200 Tax Policy Toward Art Museums
Ofcourse, not every service would deserve a subsidy just because the rev-
enue that results from charging incremental costs falls short of the total cost
of providing the service. To justify the subsidy, it must also be true that the
total value to the users ofthe service at least equals the total cost ofproviding
the service. Total costs and benefits must be measured empirically, and those
who argue for a museum subsidy have implicitly judged that the condition has
been met.
Another type ofjustification for public support ofart museums is that ben-
efits flow to many individuals in society and not just to those who visit the
museum. The preservation and display of artistic treasures provide national
prestige, educational benefits, cultural enrichment, and inherent aesthetic
value. They provide the option of future visits, even to those who are not
currently visiting. A self-supporting art museum would not take these other
benefits into account, so we say these benefits are "external." Again the pri-
vate market breaks down, because total benefits exceed the amount that can
be collected. The size ofthe external benefit is subject to measurement, but a
subsidy can correct the imbalance. 3
Other arguments have been suggested as justifications for a subsidy of art
museums. One of the most straightforward simply states that the public does
not properly appreciate art museum services, and that a subsidy is justified to
induce them to consume more than they otherwise would. The trouble with
this so-called merit good argument is that it can be applied to anything that
the advocate factors. It also is impossible to measure. Like most economists,
I reject a case for government subsidy based on these paternalistic sentiments.
Finally, free admission to art museums can be more significant for the poor
than for the middle- and upper-income groups. Statistical evidence on mu-
seum attendance shows that visits rise sharply with income, however. Feld,
O'Hare, and Schuster (1983) find that the top income group, representing 8
percent of the population, accounts for 18 percent of the visits to art mu-
seums, while the bottom income group, representing 8 percent ofthe popula-
tion, accounts for about 2 percent ofvisits to art museums.4 Therefore, subsi-
dizing museums cannot be justified as a favorable redistribution policy.
Feld, O'Hare, and Schuster (1983) also note that the benefits of visits to
3. See Baumol and Bowen (1966), Netzer (1978), Radich (1987), Scitovsky (1983), Simon
(1987), and Weisbrod (1975) for discussions ofexternal effects and the form ofthe subsidy.
4. Their data derive from the 1975 survey Americans and the Arts (Louis Harris and Asso-
ciates). The 1988 survey does not show the number of visits on a comparable basis, and it has
been criticized by Schuster (1988). It shows the following percent in each income group that
visited art museums:
Income Go Do Not Go
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museums are only part oftheir impact. They also calculate the distributional
pattern ofvarious sources ofincome to museums such as admission fees, do-
nations, and government subsidies. Admission fees are paid by those in rela-
tively high income brackets, donations are received from those in even higher
income brackets, and the deduction for gifts is "paid for" by taxpayers who
also lie predominantly in the upper brackets of the progressive personal in-
come tax. On balance, the arts are mildly redistributive in the sense that those
who finance them have income slightly higher than those who benefit.
8.2.4 Empirical Evidence on Willingness to Pay
Very little empirical evidence is available on the size ofany external bene-
fits. One exception is a study in Australia by Throsby and Withers (1983).5
Their survey results "indicate an overall acceptance ofpublic benefit accruing
from the arts, with only a small minority expressing the attitude that they
believe there are net cost and that arts education and general support are un-
justified" (183). They find that "a mean willingness-to-pay over the whole
sample lying between $97 and $155 is indicated. This range is far in excess of
the current average level ofexpenditure out of taxes on the arts in Australia,
which is in the region of$6 per head" (185). The authors provide no source
for this $6 figure, but it appears to include only direCt government expendi-
tures. Additional, implicit subsidies are provided through the exemption of
nonprofit institutions and the deductions for charitable gifts.
A less scientific survey has been conducted in the United States by Louis
Harris and Associates (1988), and part ofthe results are summarized in Table
8.2. The question posed to respondents is misleading in the way it points out
the huge cost of major federal programs such as national defense and educa-
tion, compared to "no more than 75 cents per capita for the arts." It ignores
the larger state and local expenditures on the arts (see Clotfelter, this volume),
and the still larger indirect federal subsidies provided through the tax system.
Nonetheless, the survey shows a majority of 56 percent willing to pay $25
more in taxes each yearfor the arts, and a larger majority of70percent willing
to pay an extra $10. More reliable than the levels might be the trends over
time, where each ofthese figures have been increasing steadily since 1975.
8.3 The Deduction for Charitable Giving
In our eminently democratic system, the right to vote is not the only voice
we have in government decisions about the allocation of scarce public re-
sources. When individuals or corporations decide to give to art museums in
....·thelJnitedStatesitheyeffectivelydirecttheallocationof..taxexpenditure dol-
5. They deal with the problem that survey respondents have incentive to overstate orunderstate
their willingness to pay, depending on whetherthey believe that their taxes would actually depend
on their answers. The questions are asked two different ways, and the truth is assumed to lie
between the two alternatives.202 Tax Policy Toward Art Museums
Table 8.2 Willingness to Pay Extra Tax for Arts and Culture
Question: The federal government now pays out over $900 per capita for defense, $140 for
education, and no more than 75 cents per capita for the arts. Would you be willing to pay $25
($15, $10, $5) more in taxes per year for the arts, or would you not be willing to do that?
1987 1984 1980 1975
$25 More
Willing 56% 53% 51% 41%
Not willing 42 45 45 53
Not sure 3 2 4 6
$15 More
Willing 62 61 59 46
Not willing 36 38 39 50
Not sure 2 1 2 4
$10 More
Willing 70 66 65 51
Not willing 28 32 33 44
Not sure 2 2 2 5
$5 More
Willing 75 72 70 58
Not willing 23 26 28 37
Not sure 2 2 2 5
Source: Louis Harris and Associates (1988, 105).
lars as well. The next section (8.3.1) reviews practices in several other coun-
tries and reveals that tax rules are characterized by considerable diversity.
Many nations do not allow a deduction for charitable giving, and no other
nation allows both a deduction for the market value ofthe gift and forgiveness
of capital gains tax. The following subsection reviews past practices and re-
veals that even the United States did not always allow a deduction for chari-
table giving. In addition, with the deduction, changes in marginal tax rates
have resulted in considerable changes over time in the net price of giving or
amount of the subsidy. The section also looks at Internal Revenue Service
efforts to ensure compliance, and recent changes in the alternative minimum
tax. Finally, it simulates the effects ofrate changes in the Tax Reform Act of
1986.
8.3.1 Rules in Other Countries
Tax systems vary widely, even among the 23 developed Western nations of
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
Table 8.3 summarizes some ofthe rules about deductibility from the individ-
ual income tax at the national level, but it ignores other special treatments of
art museums that might exist under a subnationallevel income tax, a corpo-
ration income tax, a wealth tax, a capital transfer tax, or a value-added tax.
Thus, this table should not be used to calculate the final tax price ofgiving in203 Don Fullerton
each country. It is only intended here to indicate the diversity of rules just
among the national level individual income tax systems.
A large number of these countries allow no deduction at all for charitable
donations. Several other countries allow deductions only under extremely re-
strictive conditions. Some allow deductions only for cash and not for the mar-
ket value ofany gifts ofproperty, so that donors have no deduction for giving
paintings to art museums. Denmark and New Zealand have very low upper
limits that would not support large gifts ofart. Luxembourg allows deductions
for gifts only to state and municipal museums and not for gifts to any private
museums. Ireland specifies a list of qualified beneficiaries that is extremely
limited and apparently excludes any art institutions (Schuster 1986, 324).
Ireland and the United Kingdom provide a tax incentive or "covenant" that
operates much like a tax deduction in some cases, as described further by
Rosemary Clarke (chap. 10 in this volume). In Britain, the pay-as-you-earn
(PAYE) system means that the taxpayer only receives net income, upon which


























The Deductibility ofDonations in OECD Countries
Deduction
Gift of$A2 or more to specified charities
None
Cash, BFlOOO or more, to 5% ofincome or BFIO million
Up to 20% ofnet income
Over DKr300, up to DKrlOOO
None
Up to I% ofnet income (causes ofgeneral interest) or 3% (charitable
foundations)
Up to 5% or 10% ofnet income
Up to 50% ofnet income
None
None
Excess of ¥ 10000, up to 25% of income
None
Excess of I% ofincome or Gld120, whichever is more
None (credit up to NZ$200)
None





Cash up to £240
Foritemizers,·cashup·to 50%·of·income··or··propertyupto30%of
income
Sources: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (1986); Price Waterhouse
(1988); and Schuster (1986).204 Tax Policy Toward Art Museums
paid on a gift out ofnet income, thetaxpayer must enter into a formal agree-
ment or covenant to give certain amounts over a minimum number of years,
recently reduced to four. Then the individual's gift is matched by a check from
the government directly to the charity. Until 1980, the government would only
match gifts at the low basic rate oftax, so that gifts from high-bracket taxpay-
ers were "subsidized" at the same rate as those from low-bracket taxpayers.
The subsidy under this system is less flexible than the straight deduction, and
it does not accommodate gifts of property. Also, Schuster (1986) notes that
the donor can put restrictions only on his or her portion ofthe gift, not on the
government's share. In the United States, the donor can specify the use ofthe
funds for the entire gift, including the government's implicit portion of sup-
port.
Also, in Britain, artwork may receive a conditional exemption from capital
transfer taxes due upon gift or bequest ifthe recipient agrees to show it pub-
licly. Upon sale, the government is able to use certain tax advantages in bid-
ding for it. Some works ofart may be accepted as payment in lieu oftax. In
the French dation system, heirs may pay estate taxes with artwork or other
objects and thus avoid finding buyers and paying commissions. For the eleven
countries on this list that have a personal wealth tax:, art is fully exempt in
Denmark, France, and Sweden; fully taxable in Finland, Norway, and Switz-
erland; and given intermediate rules in Austria, Germany, Luxembourg, Neth-
erlands, and Spain (OECD 1988, 55; Cummings and Katz 1987). These
wealth and transfer taxes are not reviewed here, but U.S. estate and gift taxes
are described in a later section (8.4.4).
8.3.2 A BriefHistory ofDeductions in the United States
For most of the time since our nation was founded, there has been no in-
come tax and therefore no indirect subsidy for charitable gifts. During the
experience that lasted from 1861 to 1872, income-tax revenue reached 28 per-
cent of total federal revenue (Ratner 1980, 142), but no deduction was al-
lowed for charitable giving even though Congress thought enough about fair-
ness to establish progressive rates, a deduction for other taxes paid, and an
allowance for housing. That tax was repealed, and other attempts at income
taxation were held unconstitutional, before the Sixteenth Amendment allowed
the enactment of a new income tax in 1913. That tax allowed deductions for
business expenses, interest paid, taxes paid, casualty losses, bad debts, depre-
ciation, corporate dividends received, and income on which tax was paid at
the source, but there was no deduction for charitable giving.
The deduction for charitable contributions was enacted in 1917, and it was
limited to 15 percent oftaxable income. At the same time, personal marginal
rates began to reach significant percentages for a small fraction oftaxpayers.
Table 8.4 summarizes the historical development ofthe top personal marginal
tax rate, the relevant rate for calculating the after-tax price of giving for the
most wealthy art donor. This top rate jumped from 15 to 67 percent during the205 Don Fullerton
Table 8.4 The Top Federal Personal Income Tax Rate in the United States





















Note: See the Tax Foundation, Facts andFigures on Government Finance, for footnotes describ-
ing some surcharges and other special rules.
First World War, but the 67-percent rate only applied to incomes over $1 mil-
lion in 1917. The great majority of donors still received no incentive, or at
most 15 percent, for charitable giving.6 The top rate fell back to 25 percent
for a period, and rose to around 90 percent for the Second World War. Itis not
clear how much revenue was actually collected at such high marginal rates,
and recent rethinking in the United States has led to successive marginal rate
reductions. The top rate fell to 70 percent in 1964, to 50 percent in 1981, and
to 33 percent in 1988, even though the revenue from the personal income tax
has been rising with the economy and has remained roughly constant as a
fraction oftotal federal revenue.
As a simplification measure for those who would no longer have to record
every itemized deduction, a standard deduction was introduced in 1944. It
was originally 10 percent of adjusted gross income (AGI) up to some maxi-
mum, but it later became a flat amount and was incorporated into a zero-rate
bracket. The incentive for charitable donations was thus removed for tax re-
turns taking the standard deduction, initially 83 percent ofthe total (Clotfelter
1985-a~-26).~As inflation and real growth decreased the~relative value alihIs
6. The 19171aw "levied no tax on net incomes below $37,700 in 1982 dollars and applied tax
rates as high as 15 percent only for net incomes above $300,000, in 1982 dollars" (Clotfelter
1985a,31).206 Tax Policy Toward Art Museums
standard deduction, until it was raised in 1971, the percentage of taxpayers
taking the standard deduction fell from 83 to 52. Also, the limit on charitable
deductions for itemizers was changed to 20 percent of AGI in 1952, to 30
percent of AGI in 1954, and to the current 50 percent of AGI in 1969 (20
percent for private foundations). Still, however, gifts of property cannot ex-
ceed 30 percent ofAGI. 7
These percentage-of-AGI limits are exceeded for only 0.2 percent of all
itemized tax returns, but for 5.5 percent of returns in the topmost income
group (Clotfelter 1985a, 27). Thus, even for those with hundreds ofthousands
ofdollars ofincome, there is no immediate deduction for most ofthe gift ofa
$1 million painting. The percentage of contributions in property rises from
less than 10 percent, at low incomes, to 60 percent for those above $1 million
per year.
Over time, donors and their recipients learned how to take advantage of
legal tax possibilities, whether those possibilities had been intended by Con-
gress or not. Two examples ofperceived abuse were corrected in the Tax Re-
form Act of 1969. First, in an arrangement that came to be known as a "bar-
gain sale," the taxpayer could sell a piece of appreciated property to the
museum at original basis, take a charitable deduction for the excess ofmarket
value over basis, and avoid tax on the entire capital gain. Consider a $10,000
painting sold for an original $5,000 cost. With a marginal tax rate of70 per-
cent, and an exclusion for half ofcapital gains, the $5,000 deduction would
save $3,500 of regular tax plus $1,750 of capital gains tax. The $5,250 tax
savings was greater than the $5,000 gift, so the after-tax price ofgiving was
negative relative to an immediate sale. Thus, the individual could sell the art
at market value for $10,000, or he or she could sell it to an art museum and
receive a total of$10,250 (plus a plaque expressing gratitude for such gener-
osity). It is not clear how much art arrived at museums in this way, and the
perception ofabuse may have derived from bargain sales to other charities of
income-producing property such as rental real estate. In any case, the 1969
act requires the taxpayer to allocate the capital gain between the sale price and
the gift (rather than assign all ofthe gain to the gift).
Second, prior to 1969, the gift ofan artist's own work could be deducted at
market value. Though perhaps not apparent at first, the artist then received
twice the tax benefit ofsomeone else giving the same piece ofart. The reason
is that the artist had not yet been taxed on the income from the unsold piece
ofwork. Suppose, for example that an artist had two pieces ofart, each worth
$10,000, and that one was sold while the other was given to a museum. The
deduction on the gift then offset the income from the sale, so the artist paid no
tax on $20,000 worth of effort. In contrast, if a plumber donated an amount
7. For a deduction at full market value, property must be "related" to the purpose ofthe donee
organization (such as art to an art museum). Contributions above either percentage limit may be
carried forward for five years. Gifts may also be "partial" interests. See Commerce Clearing
House (1988), Arthur Andersen (1987), and U.S. Congress (1969).207 Don Fullerton
of effort worth $10,000, there would be no tax on any income from those
plumbing services but no deduction against other income either.
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 changed these perceived loopholes and made
other significant changes to the taxation of exempt organizations and chari-
table contributions. Iteliminated the extreme form ofthe bargain sale, and it
put artists on the same footing as other donors by reducing their deduction by
the value oftheir effort, the excess ofmarket value over the cost ofmaterials.
It increased the fraction of AGI that can be offset by charitable deductions,
from 30 to 50 percent (except for private foundations and for appreciated
property). It introduced a 4-percent "excise tax" on the interest and dividend
income ofprivate foundations, later changed to 2 percent and then 1percent.8
The act also changed some other specific rules for tax-exempt organizations.
Finally, the 1969 act introduced the first minimum tax. This provision was
intended to prevent high-income individuals from using various tax benefits
to the point ofpaying almost no tax. Theoriginal minimum tax did not include
any ofthe benefits to charitable giving, but the concept has expanded in ways
to be discussed shortly.
Congress has always felt a certain tension between the desired simplicity of
the standard deduction and the desired incentive of the charitable deduction.
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 introduced the first charitable de-
ductions for nonitemizers, but with initial low percentages, ceilings, and ex-
piration after 1986.9 With a full deduction, the nonitemizer's price of giving
$1 falls from 1.0 to (1-t), where t is the marginal tax rate. The years from
1982 to 1986 were intended as a trial period, and the provision was not sub-
sequently renewed.
At the same time, the 1981 act significantly reduced the top marginal tax
rate, from 70 to 50 percent. The after-tax price ofgiving $1 in cash thus rises
from 30 to 50 cents for the highest income group. Data from surveys and the
IRS indicate that low-income groups (with the greatest relative number of
nonitemizers) give proportionately more to religious organizations, while
high-income groups give proportionately more to cultural institutions. The act
therefore contained a twist orcombinationofprovisions that served to encour-
age giving to some charities, such as religious organizations, and discourage
giving to other charities, such as art museums.
Finally, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 reduced personal marginal tax rates
again (and it allowed the nonitemizers' deduction to expire). The personal
exemption was increased significantly, so many low-income individuals fell
from positive to zero marginal tax rates. Multiple rates were collapsed to just
two brackets of 15 and 28 percent, but the benefits ofthe personal exemptions
8. This provision does not affect most art museums directly, but it may affect the income avail-
able for private foundations to give to art.
9. For 1982 and 1983, nonitemizers could deduct 25 percent of the first $100 of charitable
donations, for a maximum deduction of $25. They could deduct 25 percent of the first $300 in
1984,50percent ofall donations in 1985, and 100 percent ofall donations in 1986.208 Tax Policy Toward Art Museums
are phased out by a 5 percent surcharge over a specified range of income. In
other words, the marginal rate increases from 28 to 33 percent and then falls
back to 28 percent at the highest income levels. 10 The 1986 act also broadened
the tax base in several ways, including the full taxation of nominal realized
capital gains.
8.3.3 The Individual Alternative Minimum Tax
Congress has always felt another inherent tension between the desire for
incentives and the desire for actual and perceived fairness:
Although these provisions may provide incentives for worthy goals, they
become counterproductive when taxpayers are allowed to use them to avoid
virtually all tax liability. The ability of high income taxpayers to pay little
or no tax undermines respect for the entire tax system and, thus, for the
incentive provisions themselves. (U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Tax-
ation 1986)
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 extended the list of preference items under the
alternative minimum tax (AMT) to include the appreciated portion ofdonated
property deducted under the regular tax. No individual could use this deduc-
tion to avoid all tax liability, in any case, because deductions for gifts ofprop-
erty are limited to 30 percent of AGI. Nonetheless, Congress effectively felt
that some individuals were using the deduction to pay less than they should.
The act retains the full deduction for cash and for the original basis ofproperty
given to charities, but it eliminates for some taxpayers the extra incentive
provided by the forgiveness of capital gains tax. This single provision, per-
haps because it is newly enacted, currently occupies the most prominent point
of discussion about income tax policy toward art museums. As reported on
the front page of the New York Times, 7 May 1989, a study by the American
Association ofMuseums found that the value ofobjects donated in 1987 was
33 percent less than in 1986. Also, a study by the Association ofArt Museum
Directors that focused on art museums alone found that "the value of dona-
tions declined by $161 million, or 63 percent, from 1986 to 1988 for the 116
institutions reporting." The article includes statements about particular paint-
ings that were not donated because ofthe 1986 act, and it goes on to discuss
efforts in Congress to amend this provision. II
Several problems with these statistics are relevant to an overall evaluation
ofthe minimum tax provision for appreciated property. First, these figures for
donations are affected by other changes, such as the significant rate reduction
embodied in the 1986 act. For our example of property worth $10,000 that
10. Other phase-outs, such as the $25,000 passive loss allowance, can make the marginal tax
rate higher than 33 percent for certain taxpayers.
1I. At the time of this writing, in October 1989, the Senate Finance Committee has just ap-
proved an amendment by Senator John Chafee (R, RI) to repeal the inclusion of appreciated
property in the AMT.209 Don Fullerton
cost $8,000, tax savings under the regular tax were formerly $5,400 ($5,000
from the deduction at a 50-percent marginal tax rate, plus $400 from the for-
giveness ofcapital gains tax at a 20 percent rate) and fall to $3,360 ($2,800
from the deduction at the 28-percent rate and $560 ofcapital gains tax at the
28 percent rate). The price ofgiving thus rises from .460 to .664, even with-
out the minimum tax provision.
Second, appreciated property is only part ofthe picture. Figures in Giving
USA (1989) show increases every year in total donations to "arts, culture, and
















Third, these figures might represent changes in the timing ofgifts ofappre-
ciated property and therefore might not represent a change in the amount of
such gifts. Proposals to place donations of appreciated property under the
minimum tax were included in the discussions oftax reform during 1985 and
early 1986, so donors could easily anticipate the loss of certain tax benefits
after 1986. Any future planned donations were therefore more certain to re-
ceive the double incentive ifmade before the effective date in the legislation.
Indeed, the study by the American Association of Museums reports that do-
nations increased dramatically from 1985 to 1986, and that both the number
and the value of works contributed in 1987 still represent modest increases
over 1985. In some respects this showing is surprisingly strong, since we
might expect that donations moved up to 1986 would more greatly reduce
those remaining in 1987 and 1988. Furthermore, donations might be low
while current debate considers further changes. With uncertainty about future
legislation, potential donors might be induced to wait for more favorable tax
benefits. In any case, it is too early to tell whether long-run gifts of art are
affected by the inclusion ofappreciation in the minimum tax.
Finally, in light ofthe stated purpose ofthe provision, it would be useful to
know how many high-income individuals would otherwise have had low ef-
fective tax rates. To some, the greater equity is worth the loss of incentive.
Even with the broader tax base ofthe minimum tax, the AMT rate is only 21
percent. 12 Unused deductions can still be carried forward and used against
future tax liability for up to five years. And even ifthe excess is never used,
the remaining subsidy is still the same as in other countries that tax the capital
a deduction for the value ofthe
12. In this case, the cost of a $1 gift is 79 cents. Also, depending upon the taxpayer's mix of
"exclusion" preferences and "deferral" preferences, an AMT credit may be available that can
reduce the net cost ofthe gift in later years by a reduction ofregular tax.210 Tax Policy Toward Art Museums
8.3.4 Enforcement, Compliance, and the Art Advisory Panel
Recently, Congress also became concerned about abuses by taxpayers who
overvalue donations ofproperty or otherwise overstate deductions. Data from
the Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) for 1982 indicate
that 20 percent ofdonors overstate their deductions ofall kinds (and 7 percent
understate deductions). Donors of all sorts ofproperty make one-third fewer
errors, but the size of errors is one-third larger (U.S. Congress, Hearings,
1986). No statistics indicate the proportion of noncash gifts comprising art.
However, tax shelter promoters made arrangements for taxpayers to "acquire
objects such as limited edition lithographs, books, gems, and the like, hold
the property for at least the capital gains holding period, and then contribute
the items to a museum, library, educational institution, or other qualified
donee at their 'appreciated' fair market value" (U.S. Congress 1984, 503).
Moderate penalties were imposed if the overvaluation were discovered, but
enforcement was generally viewed as difficult. Accordingly, the Deficit Re-
duction Act of 1984 instituted a requirement that a qualified, unrelated ap-
praisal be undertaken before any deduction is claimed for property worth
$5,000 or more. The appraiser can be subject to civil tax penalties for aiding
and abetting an understatement oftax liability. Also, any donee that disposes
ofthe property within two years must report what was received for it. Finally,
penalties for overvaluation were increased.
For works valued at more than $20,000, the IRS generally considers
whether to seek review from an official Art Advisory Panel, made up of 25
members including art dealers, museum directors, curators, and art scholars.
This panel was established in 1968, and members volunteer their services
without pay. The total operating budget for travel and other expenses is about
$15,000 per year, and yet from 1977 to 1985, the panel reviewed 1565 cases
involving 6717 items. It recommended adjustments for halfofthese items, by
$115 million or 22 percent ofthe total $525 million claimed (U.S. Congress,
Hearings 1986). These adjustments seem to have increased since 1984, to
73.5 percent ofitems and 36 percent ofthe value claimed.
Moreover, the IRS seems willing to establish special-purpose panels that
last only a finite period. In response to a flood ofcases related to a particular
shelter scheme, the IRS in 1982 established an Art Print Advisory Panel that,
through 1985, reviewed 1650 items upon which $219 million of deductions
were claimed. In these cases it recommended adjustments of$216 million, a
full 98.6 percent reduction from the amounts claimed (Anthoine 1987).
This combination ofprovisions would seem virtually to eliminate any pos-
sibility for abuse, but several minor advantages remain. First, note that the
donor is still able to claim adeduction for the fair market value ofthe property,
even though a sale would probably only provide the fair market value less a
significant commission. Second, nothing in these provisions would seem to
prevent the donor of a particularly valuable piece from obtaining several dif-211 Don Fullerton
ferent qualified, unrelated appraisals. Even valid professional estimates are
bound to vary to some degree, and the donor could pick the highest value for
use as the deduction. Finally, note that the issue ofappraisal would not even
arise if the deduction were limited, as in other countries, to cash or to the
original basis of appreciated property. Alternatively, if full capital gains tax
were collected on the appreciated portion ofthe property before the gift were
deducted, then any overstatement of value would increase the taxable capital
gain by as much as it increased the deduction. In other words, even with cor-
rect valuation, the taxpayer under the regular tax stilI gets the double incen-
tive of the deduction against ordinary income plus the forgiveness of capital
gains tax.
8.3.5 The Effect of Incentives on the Amount ofGiving
Many studies have attempted to measure the various determinants ofchari-
table contributions, including the donor's income level, tax incentives, and
other demographic characteristics. An important parameter for policy pur-
poses is the "price elasticity," defined as the percentage change in giving for a
1 percent change in the after-tax price ofgiving. Similarly, the "income elas-
ticity" is the relative change in giving for a 1 percent addition to income.
Some ofthe equations and assumptions used to estimate these parameters are
described in appendix A.
Some studies use data on the total amount of charitable giving each year,
aggregate income, and an overall price (1 minus a weighted average of per-
sonal marginal tax rates). This aggregate time-series analysis relies mostly on
statutory changes in marginal tax rates to measure the response in giving.
Alternatively, some studies use one year's surveyor tax return data for differ-
ent households. This cross-section approach relies on differences in marginal
tax rates and differences in giving, while trying to control for differences in
level ofincome and other characteristics.
Researchers have been concerned not just with the size of the estimated
price elasticity, but whether it is greater than 1. This value represents a critical
benchmark in the sense that it determines whether the extra giving generated
by the tax incentive is greater than the government's revenue cost. Ifthe elas-
ticity is less than 1, when a new tax incentive reduces the after-tax price of
giving, then the proportional increase in giving is less than the proportional
decrease in price. In this case, the individual's out-of-pocket cost actually
falls. Since the individual's outlay falls while the gift rises, government must
be making up the difference. The tax incentive is "ineffective" in the sense
that the donee would receive more ifthe government just delivered their con-
..... tributiondirectly·without·causingtheindividual's outlay to falloiL.
13. Feldstein (1980) points out that individuals may respond to direct government support by
donating less themselves. In this case, the critical elasticity is zero, and a percentage subsidy
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Early research tended to find elasticities less than 1 (Vickery 1975, 157),
but more recent work has found larger responses. Martin Feldstein (1975a)
employed a time-series of IRS statistics on itemizers in 17 AGI groups. He
used several sets ofassumptions, but his basic specification resulted in a price
elasticity of 1.24. To include nonitemizers and data on wealth, Feldstein and
Clotfelter (1976) used a national survey of 1,406 households that was con-
ducted by the Federal Reserve in 1963-64. The basic estimate for the price
elasticity was 1.15 in this case. Also, Feldstein and Taylor (1976) used indi-
vidual returns from the Treasury Department tax files. The estimated price
elasticity was 1.09 using 1962 returns, and it was 1.20 using 1970 returns.
The time-series and cross-section approaches were then combined when Clot-
felter (1980) was able to employ the Treasury's panel study of low- and
middle-income taxpayers that were followed for several years. These data al-
lowed exact measurement of marginal tax rates that reflect income averaging
and optional forms of deductions. It resulted in an estimate of 1.40 for the
long-run price elasticity.
These price elasticity estimates are all close to each other, especially con-
sidering the substantial differences in the nature of the data and the level of
aggregation. More recent research concludes that the price elasticity ofchari-
table giving is greater than 1, though perhaps not much greater than 1. This
implies that donees receive more than the government loses in tax revenue.
An important caveat, however, is that each of these estimates refers to an
aggregate elasticity. They implicitly assume that all individuals follow the
same behavioral rule for all kinds of giving. In fact, even if the elasticity is
constant for a given individual or group, we would not necessarily expect it to
be constant across individuals or groups. Also, the estimation lumps together
different commodities. A given consumer's needs or wants may not be the
same for gifts to different organizations. Such differences might be important
for the study of art museums, because of special features of those gifts. Art
museums receive donations predominantly from high-income taxpayers who
itemize deductions and who might have a sensitivity to price that is different
from the average. They also receive a high proportion ofgifts in the form of
property, gifts that might have a responsiveness different from other dona-
tions.
Several studies have attempted to measure variations in price elasticities for
different income levels or donee organizations, as reviewed in Clotfelter
(1985a, 63-71). The results allow no clear conclusions, largely because of
limitations in the data. On the one hand, tax return data allow the calculation
of an accurate after-tax price of giving for each household, but they do not
include wealth variables, nonitemizers, or donee organizations. On the other
hand, survey data (such as the National Study of Philanthropy or the Con-
sumer Expenditure Survey) include more detail on gifts, but they have fewer
high-income households and less information on taxes.
Nevertheless, it is useful to look in more detail at some ofthe disaggregate213 Don Fullerton
results. In the first effort to distinguish types of giving, Feldstein (1975b)
estimated elasticities for five different types of charitable organizations. He
used 1962 IRS data on each type ofgiving in each AGI class. He found that































Unfortunately, the data do not identify art or even culture as a separate cate-
gory. Instead, museums are aggregated with other diverse organizations in the
"all other" category. Art museums are probably more similar to educational
institutions than to other organizations with which they are aggregated, but
the estimated price elasticity is more than 2.0 in either case.
In a different breakdown, Clotfelterand Steuerle (1981) estimate elasticities
separately for five income groups using the Treasury's 1975 tax file and the
seven-year panel study of individual taxpayers. They include only itemizers
(for whom charitable giving is recorded in the tax return data). The basic set
ofestimated elasticities are as follows: 15
Elasticity with respect to:
Price Income
These results are consistent with those above for donee organizations, in that
the more responsive, high-income groups give proportionately more to edu-
cational institutions (and art museums), while the less responsive, low-
income groups give proportionately more to religious organizations.
No study reports elasticities separately for gifts of cash and gifts of prop-
erty. The best available information is from Slemrod (1988), a study that is
14, lI()w~ver,.l)ye(19?8)aIld geece(12?9)...find thlltthe pri<:e elasticity for religious giving is
.... ··~71igherthanfoiothei categoriei These studies use individual survey data, with less good tax
information, while Feldstein uses aggregate IRS data for 17 income classes, with few observa-
tions.
15. In contrast, Feldstein (1975a) and Feldstein and Taylor (1976) included specifications for
which the estimated price elasticity falls with income. For low-income groups, less variation in
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intended to investigate whether the previous estimated price elasticities are
biased by misreporting oftaxpayers who respond to higher tax rates by over-
stating their deductions, rather than actually increasing their donations. Slem-
rod uses IRS data from intensive audits conducted by the Taxpayer Compli-
ance Measurement Program (TCMP) that include the donations reported by
the taxpayer as well as the amount deemed by the auditor to be the correct
amount ofdeduction. He estimates elasticities using both the reported and the
corrected deductions and finds that the estimated price elasticity only changes
from 2.04 to 2.34, and income elasticity from 0.35 to 0.27.
The important aspect ofthese data for our purpose is that they separate cash
gifts from property. The paper by Slemrod does not report specific results for
the two types ofgifts, but says:16
The results for cash contributions, which accounted for 87% ofthe value of
all contributions by itemizers in 1982, are quite similar to the aggregated
results-price elasticities in excess of two, which rise slightly when re-
ported contributions are replaced by auditor-adjusted contributions. For
non-cash contributions, the estimated price elasticity is approximately ...
one and the estimated income elasticity is approximately 0.1. Neither of
these estimated coefficients changes much when auditor-adjusted contribu-
tions are substituted for reported contributions. (1988, 16)
The lower price elasticity for gifts ofproperty may seem surprising, especially
in light of the higher price elasticity for high-income donors shown above.
However, much of this property may be secondhand clothes for resale shops
orcharities, rather than art for museums.
Finally, note that income elasticities are less than 1.0 in most ofthe results
reported above. An implication is that a simple reduction of taxes that puts
more after-tax income into the hands ofconsumers is not an effective way to
increase their charitable giving. Ifthe objective is to increase charitable giv-
ing, the most effective tax policy would target the price ofgiving for the most
responsive donors.
8.3.6 Rate Reduction and Giving to Art Museums
A major goal of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was to reduce personal mar-
ginal tax rates that took up to 50 percent ofany additional income from work
effort, savings, or any form of economic activity in the market. Such rates
encourage taxpayers to stay home, to work outside the regular market, and
even to evade taxes on market income. They interfere with financial debt!
equity choices, entrepreneurship, and the balance of investment portfolios.
16. This study is not exempt from data and other problems discussed above that lead to consid-
erable uncertainty about the estimates and some disagreements about their size. Additional prob-
lems led Slemrod to omit the specific results. In particular, the same weighted average price from
appendix equation (3) was used both for cash gifts and for property, instead of using (l - t) in
the regressions for gifts of cash and (l - t - a . g) in the regressions for gifts of appreciated
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For many reasons, lower marginal tax rates are expected to increase produc-
tive economic activity as well as to have positive feedback effects on tax rev-
enue.
Given these favorable effects, rate reduction is consistent with the benevo-
lent objectives of charitable organizations. Yet given that the incentive for
gifts to charities is in the form of a deduction, lower marginal tax rates are
also expected to reduce charitable donations. Thus, rather than oppose rate
reduction, charities might favor maintaining the subsidy at prior levels by
switching to a credit with the same revenue cost as the prior deduction. I?
In any case, previously estimated price elasticities can be used to "predict"
the effects ofthe 1986 rate reduction. IS The tax reform is not expected to have
any major effects through income elasticities, since it was approximately rev-
enue neutral and distributionally neutral. I9 Data from the Treasury Depart-
ment on the average change in the marginal tax rate in each income group is
shown in columns 2 and 3 of table 8.5. The tax reform dropped many poor
families off the tax rolls and thus lowered the average ofthe marginal rates in
the lowest income group from 2.7 to 2.0 percent. It raised the lowest bracket
from 11 to 15 percent, however, so the next group actually experienced a
slight increase in their average marginal rate. All other groups benefited from
substantial rate reduction, especially the top income group where the marginal
rate fell from an average of45.5 to 28.9 percent. Notice that the penultimate
group is left with a 32.2-percent rate, on average, because many ofthese tax-
payers are in the 33-percent bracket that precedes the final 28 percent bracket.
Columns 4 and 5 then employ appendix equation (3) to calculate the price
of giving, using IRS data on the fraction given in cash vs. property, and as-
suming that all groups give property with value that is halfappreciation.20 The
price ofgiving changes very little in the lower brackets that tend to give little
or nothing to arts and culture, but it rises from .52 to .67 in the top income
group that gives most to this category. The top income group gives proportion-
ately more in the form ofproperty, and the Tax Reform Act raises the capital
17. Ifall taxpayers were allowed the same rate ofcredit, a remaining problem would be that the
subsidy would rise for low-bracket donors and fall for high-bracket donors, those who give rela-
tively more to art museums.
18. These calculations do not predict actual giving for some future year, because they do not
include income and demographic variables that would also affect actual future gifts. Instead, they
isolate the effects of the price change, as ifthere were no other changes. They ignore the AMT.
Tax rate changes in the 1986 act will be shown to reduce gifts, but higher subsequent income
levels will raise actual subsequent gifts.
19. The Tax Reform Act shifted $120 billion oftax over five years from individuals to corpo-
rations, but the corporate taxes are implicitly paid through higher prices, lowerwages, orreduced
.... ~divideQds~JJ!ss!!methl,ltiQ<:Iivi<:l!!l,Ils JeeIIlOJj£heLllyshiftillg!liJ(!o...corporati()lls,.!'I()£hllllgeill
real income implies no effect through income elasticities.
20. Clotfelter (l985b) discusses the possibility that taxpayers in higher brackets have assets
with higher gain-to-value ratios, and choose those with the greatest gains to give to charity. On the
other hand, these assets are less likely to be sold for consumption and more likely to be held until
death to avoid capital gains tax. "The two factors thus tend to offset one another, to what degree it
is impossible to say" (p. 207).Table 8.5 Predicted Change for Individual Giving to Arts and Culture
Gifts to Art and Culture
Marginal Tax Rate % Price ofGiving ($ millions)
AGI Price % Change
Group Old Law TRA Old Law TRA Elasticity Old Law TRA Gifts
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
o-IOK 2.7 2.0 .97 .98 -0.47 .0 .0 .0
lo-20K 15.7 15.9 .84 .83 0.32 .0 .0 .0
2o-30K 20.9 17.9 .79 .81 0.56 .0 .0 .0
3O-50K 26.4 21.5 .73 .78 0.75 .0 .0 .0
5O-75K 32.8 27.8 .66 .70 0.90 173.2 164.2 -5.2
75-100K 38.3 29.1 .61 .69 1.04 113.3 99.3 -12.4
IOo-200K 41.9 32.2 .57 .65 1.17 181.8 154.7 -14.9
200K + 45.5 28.9 .52 .67 1.71 573.0 370.8 -35.3
Total 1041.3 789.0 -24.2
Notes andSources (by column): (I) AGI = adjusted gross income, in K = thousands ofdollars; (2) and (3) weighted average in each group, from U.S. Treasury
Dept. TRA = Tax Reform Act; (4) and (5) calculated from appendix equation (3) using column 4 of table 8.1 for (I - C), a = .5 for the ratio of appreciation
to value, and assuming that the alternative is immediate consumption. The old law uses column 2 for t, and g = .4t. TRA uses column 3 for t and g; (6) calculated
from prices in column 4, the average income in each group, and coefficients in Clotfelter and Steuerle (1981). The appropriate income measure is AGI "minus the
tax liability that would have been due if no contributions had been made" (Clotfelter and Steuerle, 424), calculated using Treasury data on average AGI and tax
liability in each group, SOl data on gifts, and column 4 prices; (7) calculated from total gifts in SOl for 1985, and proportions given to culture in Clotfelter
(l985b); and (8) calculated from appendix equation (4) using columns 4 through 7.217 Don Fullerton
gains rate from a maximum of 20 to 33 percent. Column 6 then shows the
price response derived from the variable elasticity formula of Clotfelter and
Steuerle (1981) using IRS data on 1985 incomes and column 4 data on
prices.21 The price elasticity ranges from very low values in the lowest income
group to 1.7 in the highest income group. Finally, column 7 uses data from
the IRS on the 1985 level of gifts from each group, and from Clotfelter
(l985b) on the allocation ofgifts in each group.
With these figures, appendix equation (4) generates the new hypothetical
amount of giving in each group shown in column 8, and the percentage
change shown in column 9. The top income group has the largest elasticity,
the largest increase in price ofgiving, andthe largest amount ofgiving to the
arts. As a consequence, their gifts fall by 35 percent, and the total for all
groups falls by 24 percent.22
8.4 Other Taxes Affecting Art Museums
As nonprofit organizations, art museums do not pay corporate or personal
income tax. No tax is paid on receipts from donations, membership dues,
admission fees, or income to the endowment. Moreover, in some special
cases, art museums can issue tax-exempt bonds to finance capital projects at
an interest rate that is lower than the market rate for taxable debt. To serve
their visitors on the premises, art museums can operate, and pay no tax on
income from, a parking lot, a restaurant, and a gift shop.
Several tax provisions affect some art museums directly, however. If it is
organized as a private operating foundation, for example, the art museum
might pay a 1 or 2 percent excise tax on income of the endowment. 23 If it
operates a business that is not related to its charitable purpose-such as a
21. Since the estimating equation is more complicated than appendix equation (2), Clotfelter
(l985a, 69-70) shows thatthepriceelasticity is calculated by 4.31 - 0.54[ln(Y)] - 0.50[ln(P)].
22. The nonitemizers' deduction was previously set to expire after 1986, so the Tax Reform Act
had no effect on their price of giving. Calculations here pertain only to itemizers, but gifts of
nonitemizers are highly concentrated in low-income brackets that give little or nothing to arts and
culture. Including gifts to the arts ofthe few nonitemizers in high-income groups, the total change
is 24. I rather than 24.2percent.
23. Loosely speaking, every nonprofit organization is a private foundation unless it qualifies as
a public charity by being an educational, religious, cultural, scientific, or social-welfare organi-
zation with a high fraction of funding from gifts or from charging for related services. "This
requirement is designed to insure that the organization is responsive to the general public" (U.S.
Congress 1969). Thus an art museum can qualify as a charity by receiving enough gifts or by
charging fees for admission. A museum that operates on the basis of a large endowment, rather
than ongoing gifts or admission fees, might have to pay the excise tax. In general, private foun-
diltionsarealsostiDjectloaloWef'(20'pefcefitJlimit'oifAGltnatcaifbededucted"bydohofS;an:d'
to otheroperating restrictions designed to prevent undue accumulations ofwealth and private gain
(self-dealing rules, payout requirements, excess business holding limitations, and restrictions on
the nature ofgrants). However, a private "operating" foundation can qualify for the higher limits
by using two-thirds ofits assets to carry out its programs. Thus, even ifthe art museum is a private
foundation and pays the excise tax, it can receive deductible donations ofup to 50 percent ofAGI
by having most ofits assets in art that is open to view. See Fremont-Smith (1965, 1972), and the
1989 U.S. Master Tax Guide (Commerce Clearing House 1988).218 Tax Policy Toward Art Museums
restaurant off the premises or the sales ofobjects other than prints ofits art-
the museum must pay the unrelated business income tax (UBIT). In addition,
the income tax on other corporations may affect their charitable donations and
thereby affect art museums. Each ofthese tax provisions is discussed in tum.
8.4.1 Income Tax Exemption and the Cost ofCapital
Many observers have pointed to various tax exemptions as forms ofsubsidy
that allow "unfair competition" with other small businesses that must pay tax
when providing some ofthe same goods and services. It is said, for example,
that a private health fitness center must pay tax while the YMCA can provide
the same services without tax and therefore at a lower cost. Wages and salaries
are subject to the saine payroll and personal income taxes, so the tax exemp-
tion must be said to lower the costofcapital rather than oflabor. Is there really
a cost advantage? The U.S. Treasury (1988) notes that:
Because the nonprofit organization enjoys a . . . higher rate of return on
other uses ofits capital, including passive investments, the relative "oppor-
tunity cost" ofentering a particular business... can be equivalent for tax-
able and exempt organizations. As a result, taxable and exempt businesses
may be in the same relative position with respect to the decision whether or
not to enter a particular business.
To help evaluate these views, appendix B provides a general framework that
measures the cost of capital, defined as the gross-of-tax rate of return that a
project must earn to cover taxes and the opportunity cost of the funds. The
opportunity cost is the net return that the funds could have earned in some
other investment. This cost ofcapital is shown to be identical for taxable firms
and nonprofits, as suggested in the above quote, as long as the tax applies to
economic income indexed for inflation. The cost ofcapital for the taxable firm
could be higher ifdepreciation allowances at historical cost are insufficient to
cover replacement cost, and it could be lower for taxable firms if they are
allowed an investment tax credit or accelerated depreciation in excess ofeco-
nomic depreciation at replacement cost. Thus the taxable firm could have a
cost advantage over nonprofits.
This equivalence result does not depend upon whether the funds for the
project are obtained from taxable debt or equity. Whatever the actual source
of finance, the project always must cover the return that could be earned by
putting the money into taxable bonds. The private firm pays taxes on income
from the project, but it has a lower opportunity cost of funds because it can
only earn the net-of-tax interest rate on this alternative. The nonprofit pays no
taxes, but its project has the higher opportunity cost ofcovering the full mar-
ket interest rate that could have been earned instead.24
The U.S. Treasury (1988) goes on to say:
24. One potential problem is that the nonprofit does not earn the same rate of return on its
holdings ofdebt and equity. The return on the project should be compared to the next best oppor-
tunity, that is, whichever rate of return is higher. For untaxed institutions, the interest rate on219 Don Fullerton
Nonetheless, when tax exemption is combined with other governmental
subsidies-such as the ability of some exempt organizations to issue tax-
exempt bonds, access to lower postal rates, exemption from certain federal
excise taxes, and exemption from certain state and local taxes-an exempt
organization's cost of producing goods and services for sale is further re-
duced.
Lower postal rates and exemptions from state and local tax are considered by
Clotfelter (in this volume), but the issue of tax-exempt bonds fits nicely into
the framework developed here.
The cost ofcapital depends on the alternative rate ofreturn that the invest-
ment must cover. If the exempt organization trades off more of the project
against having more interest-bearing endowment, then the above analysis
holds. Ifinterest-bearing endowment is fixed, however, and the organization
is allowed to use tax-exempt debt to finance the project, then the relevant cost
is the tax-exempt interest rate. Since that rate is less than the market interest
rate, the cost of capital is reduced. Thus a government-connected museum
that can issue tax-exempt debt can provide services more cheaply.
The next section makes use ofthis analysis to consider specific issues ofthe
unrelated business income tax. In particular, the issue is clouded by an inher-
ent contradiction between the desire to subsidize one activity (that may have
external benefits) and to treat similarly a competing activity (that may not
have external benefits).
8.4.2 The Unrelated Business Income Tax and "Unfair" Competition
Despite the doubts just raised, this section will follow existing literature in
assuming that the nonprofit's exempt status does confer a real or perceived
cost advantage.25 One question is whether this cost advantage is justified by
external benefits, and another question is whether the cost advantage results
in "unfair" competition.
In section 8.2, I discussed how tax advantages may be justified by spillover
social benefits and/or the cost structure of museum services. Ifthese benefits
are sufficiently large, we might want certain nonprofits such as art museums
to be subsidized not only through deductions for gifts and exemption of pas-
sive investment income, but through exemption ofactive business income as
well. They could then provide more ofthe desired art.
The Revenue Act of 1950 effectively decided that the deduction for gifts
and the exemption of passive investment income were sufficient subsidy. It
introduced a separate tax at the corporate rate on the nonprofit's active busi-
ness income that is not "substantially related" by having a causal relationship
~. ~..... ~~.. that"contributesimportantly"to·theaccomplishmentoftheorganization'sex~
empt purposes, other than the mere need for funds (U.S. Treasury 1988).
taxable bonds is usually higher than the return after corporate tax on corporate stock. Thus, even
ifthe funds come from donations, the cost offunds is the interest rate ontaxable bonds.
25. See Copeland and Rudney (1986) or Schiff(1988) for examples.220 Tax Policy Toward Art Museums
























Source: Grabowski and Soffer (l988j.
These rules have been modified in piecemeal fashion by Congress, Treasury
regulations, and the courts. They have come to be viewed as complex and
arbitrary, and their scope is still a subject ofsome debate.
Relatedness is now determined item by item, so separate accounts must be
kept even within a single gift shop. The sale ofan art print is exempt, but the
sale ofa T-shirt with the museum logo is not. What about the sale ofa T-shirt
with art printed on it? The museum is left to decide such details, subject to
IRS and court objections, so it has every incentive to make aggressive inter-
pretations.26
Moreover, these administrative difficulties lead to problems ofenforcement
and compliance. The IRS estimated that the voluntary compliance level
(VCL) for unrelated business income was only 21.2 percent in 1973, and 46.3
percent in 1983 (U.S. Internal Revenue Service 1988, F-24), but they believe
that the increase is due to broader examination coverage rather than to in-
creased compliance. Grabowski and Soffer (1988) provide further results of
IRS examinations, as summarized in table 8.6. They show that the UBIT er~
rors of private foundations have increased ninefold between the 1973-74 pe-
riod and the 1979-83 period. In the public charity category, UBIT errors have
declined 76 percent over the same span, even though the percentage ofpublic
charities with such income has increased from 2.8 to 5.8.
Total UBIT revenues are less than 0.05 percent ofthe corporate income tax
(Rose-Ackerman 1982), butthis figure may not reflect its true revenue impact.
Without this provision, much more business activity might be undertaken by
exempt organizations instead of corporations, with a loss of corporate reve-
nue. Also, the provision is intended to "regulate" the activities of nonprofit
organizations, since, without it, substantial untaxed commercial activity
could divert an organization from its primary purpose and make it accountable
neither to donors nor to shareholders.
Yet the primary purpose of UBIT is not related to the size of the external
benefit, the need for revenue, or the desire to regulate. The provision is in-
tended primarily to address the perceived problem that the exempt organiza-
26. The Boston Museum ofFine Arts recently tried to help advertise their Egyptian exhibit by
selling chocolate mummies in the gift shop, but this item was deemed to be subject to UBIT.221 Don Fullerton
tion operating in an unrelated business would have an unfair advantage over
other private business in the same activity.
Even with a cost differential, Rose-Ackerman (1982) points out that there
may be no ill effect on other private business. First, ifthe nonprofit represents
a small part ofthe total market for that particular good or service, it will have
no effect on the equilibrium price and therefore no effect on otherprivate busi-
ness. Second, suppose that the nonprofit's activity does affect the price, but
that other private firms face no significant fixed costs ofentry or exit. In this
case, any other firm can shift out of that activity and into a different activity
where it can earn the same equilibrium market rate ofreturn it earned before,
with no adverse effects. Third, if there do exist costs of entry or exit, other
private businesses could reasonably be expected to anticipate competition
from nonprofits at the time oftheir initial commitment to the industry and thus
to make only investments that cover the fixed cost and still earn their required
rate of return. That is, the fully informed taxable firm would only undertake
investments that improve its situation, so the differential rates ofreturn do not
inflict any injury. Fourth, even ifthe nonprofit's competition is unanticipated,
the reduced return to the other private businesses might not be unwarranted if
the industry is not initially competitive and thus affords an unusually high rate
ofreturn.
The only remaining case with a potential problem is where the industry
initially is competitive, the nonprofit's entry is unanticipated, the nonprofit's
activity is large enough to affect the market price, andthe other private busi-
nesses would incur significant fixed costs of leaving this activity or entering
another. For this reason, Rose-Ackerman concludes that UBIT is "exactly the
wrong way to respond to the problem" (1982, 1037). Itencourages nonprofits
to concentrate in activities judged to be related, where they are more likely to
affect the equilibrium market price. And since tax rules keep mcdifying the
definition of unrelated activities, UBIT keeps imposing unanticipated wind-
fall gains and losses. "It appears, then, that the tax on unrelated business
activity creates more unfairness than it can possibly prevent. It should there-
fore be repealed" (p. 1038).
Rose-Ackerman provides a very useful analysis, but it does not support her
own conclusion. The complete repeal of UBIT would represent the largest
possible unanticipated change to existing tax rules in this area. Nonprofit or-
ganizations would probably expand in certain familiar activities, rather than
enter many diffuse activities, where private firms have invested much fixed
capital and are earning only normal competitive rates ofreturn. The repeal of
UBIT would thus reduce returns to existing businesses and impose large cap-
··itallosses.
The analysis is correct that differential rates ofreturn are not unfair so long
as private businesses know about the differences before they enter the activity.
Any tax change can impose windfall gains and losses, hence the adage "an
old tax is a good tax." The implication for tax policy in this case is to minimize222 Tax Policy Toward Art Museums
changes by nailing down a workable definition ofrelated activities that does
not require constant revision. Any unchanging definition avoids being unfair
to private businesses, but administrative and compliance costs can be mini-
mized by a definition that does not require multiple books and arbitrary clas-
sifications.
Similarly, a tax on museums' unrelated business is not unfair as long as
they know the rules beforehand or can exit without cost. A tax on museums'
related services might be unfair, since they cannot exit from their primary
responsibility. Again, as discussed above, the tax exemption for related activ-
ities can be viewed simply as a way to encourage museum services that have
important social benefits, and even a tax exemption on unrelated activities
could be viewed as another way to enable them to expand those museum ser-
vices.
8.4.3 The Corporate Income Tax Deduction
While the corporate income tax does not apply to the primary and related
activities ofart museums, itdoes affect the donations made to art museums by
other corporations. Such donations were not deductible under the corporate
income tax until 1935, but it was fairly easy for corporations to make chari-
table expenses look like business expenses. As a consequence, early data on
corporate charitable contributions is not very reliable. From 1936 to 1980,
while corporations were allowed to deduct contributions up to 5 percent of
taxable income, data in Clotfelter (1985a) show that gifts increased 14 times
in real terms, from $91 million to $2.32 billion (in 1972 dollars). As a fraction
of net income, however, these gifts were 0.28 percent in 1936 and 0.79 per-
cent in 1980.
The maximum fraction of taxable income was raised from 5 to 10 percent
in 1981, with little effect on most firmsY Only 7.5 percent of corporations
make contributions of more than $500 per year, and less than one-quarter
make any contribution. These differences are related to size and profitability,
as contributions were made by 35 percent ofprofitable firms and only 2 per-
cent of loss firms (Useem 1987). Contributions were made by 80 percent of
corporations with assets exceeding $0.5 billion (0.1 percent of all corpora-
tions), and these account for 50 percent of all corporate gifts. Still, most of
these firms give less than 5 percent ofincome, and corporate giving averages
less than 2 percent ofcorporate income.
Corporations and individuals donate similar percentages ofincome, on av-
27. The 1981 act also reduced the measure oftaxable income, however, so the limit on deduc-
tions for some firms may actually fall. Also, firms may use a figure like 5 percent as a rule of
thumb, or as a goal for enhancing their corporate image. For example, the Greater Minneapolis
ChamberofCommerce honors area firms giving at least 5 percent ofincome. The lower measure
oftaxable income may have made it easier for some firms to attain that goal. Minneapolis reports
that they honored 45 firms giving 5 percent in each year from 1979 to 1981, and from 71 to 76
firms in every year between 1983 and 1986.223 Don Fullerton
erage, but corporate income is considerably smaller. Thus corporate gifts are
about one-fifteenth the size ofindividual gifts (Clotfelter 1985a). In the non-
religious, nonprofit sector, where private gifts constitute 22 percent of total
resources, corporate gifts account for only 2 percent of the total (Useem
1987).
For sufficient detail to isolate contributions to art, table 8.7 uses data col-
lected by The Conference Board in their survey of major corporations (Troy
1984; Platzer 1988). For the majorcategories ofbeneficiaries, the table shows
that gifts to health and human service organizations have fallen steadily from
42 percent ofcorporate gifts in 1972 to 28 percent in 1986; gifts to education
and to civic organizations have increased slightly over the same period as
percentages of corporate giving; gifts to the "other" category have fallen
somewhat; and gifts to culture and art have more than doubled as a percent of
total giving, from 4.1 percent in 1972 to 11.9 percent in 1986. The penulti-
mate row ofthe table shows that total corporate gifts have increased from $1.0
billion to $4.5 billion over the period, so the category ofculture and art has
clearly been a major beneficiary of this trend. The bottom row shows that
these gifts have almost doubled as a percent ofpretax income.
The table also shows components of the culture and art category, where
gifts to museums have increased from 1.8 percent of the total in 1974 to 2.3
percent in 1986. Gifts to art funds and councils and gifts to other categories
have remained fairly stable. The most dramatic increase within culture and art
is the subcategory for employee matching gifts. In other words, corpora-
tions are starting to direct their own gifts to the organization favored by their
workers.
These breakdowns also depend on size and other characteristics of firms.
Large firms are less likely to give to health and human services and more
likely to give to education and to civic organizations. Gifts to culture and art
are somewhat related to size.28 Differences are more dramatic by industry.
Firms in printing and publishing have been giving about 20 percent of gifts
each year to art and culture, and the seven firms in the survey from the stone,
clay, and glass industry are giving 38 percent to art and culture. Even more
startling, the subcategory for museums gets 32 percent ofthe total gifts from
this industry.
Why might a corporation make a donation, and how might taxes affect the
donation? A firm trying to maximize profits for shareholders would seem to
have few charitable motives, but donations might still be part ofa package the
firm can use to increase profits or share values indirectly. When Galaskiewicz
(1986) asked top managers to rank a set offirms, he found that those with the
..JargesLgivingpmgramswererankedasthemost...successful., ..even...controlling
28. Among firms giving less than $500,000, the median firm gives 8.9 percent to culture and
art, and among firms giving $5 million or more, the median gives 11.6 percent to culture and art
(Platzer 1988).Table 8.7 Beneficiaries ofCorporate Support as Percent ofTotal Giving
1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986
Health and human services 42.0 38.5 39.3 36.9 34.0 31.0 27.7 28.0
Education 36.9 36.0 37.3 37.0 37.8 40.7 38.9 42.9
Culture and art 4.1 7.3 8.2 10.1 10.9 11.4 10.7 11.9
Music - 1.1 1.1 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4
Museums - 1.8 1.9 2.5 2.4 2.5 2.1 2.3
Public TV and radio - 1.7 1.2 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.3
Art Funds and councils - 1.0 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.7
Theaters - 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.8
Cultural centers - - 0.9 1.0 1.1 0.8 1.0 0.7
Dance - - 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3
Libraries - - 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2
Employee matching - - * * 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.9
Other - 1.0 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.1 1.1 1.0
Not identifiable - 0.3 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.6 1.6 2.3
Civic and community 9.1 10.4 11.0 11.4 11.7 11.7 18.8 13.2
Other 6.6 7.7 4.2 4.5 5.6 5.2 3.9 4.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
In billions ofdollars 1.0 1.2 1.5 2.1 2.4 2.9 4.1 4.5
Percent of pretax income 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.7 1.7 1.9
Sources: Troy (1984) and Platzer (1988).
Note: Category percentages do not add up to exactly 100 because ofrounding. The percentage breakdowns by beneficiary category are based on survey responses
from a different number offirms each year. The smallest number ofcompanies was 370 (for 1986), and the largest number was 799 (for 1972). In the last two
rows, however, the totals and percent ofincome figures reflect contributions ofall U.S. corporations.
*Less than 0.1 percent.225 Don Fullerton
for actual earnings and other measures ofperformance. Second, the publicity
surrounding large gifts can act as a form of advertising. A certain kind of
image can attract customers. Third, gifts to the community can make the com-
munity a more desirable place to live and work, possibly reducing labor costs.
Fourth, the managers of the firm may be acting on their own motives rather
than maximizing the profits of the firm. Several models of this type are re-
viewed in Clotfelter (l985a). Finally, a more tax-oriented reason for charity
might lie in the double taxation ofcorporate source income. Ifthe sharehold-
ers were going to be giving a certain amount to charity anyway, and if they
can agree on the set and mix ofbeneficiaries, then they can save even more of
the total tax on that income by making the donations at the corporate level
instead ofpaying the corporate tax and then making donations outofpersonal
income from dividends.
These alternative theories ofcorporate giving have implications for the ef-
fect oftax changes on donations. Both charitable expenses and advertising are
deductible, so a change in the statutory corporate tax rate has no effect on the
price ofgiving relative to the price ofadvertising. Thus, ifgifts are a form of
advertising, changes in the corporate rate may have no effect on gifts. But if
shareholders want the corporation to donate for them, then the corporate rate
does affect the overall price of giving. The actual effect ofthe corporate rate
on gifts is subject to empirical investigation.
Large corporations with most charitable donations are all in the top corpo-
rate rate bracket, so cross-section data does not include enough variation in
after-tax prices to allow estimation ofa price elasticity. They generally find an
income elasticity that is less than 1, as reviewed in Clotfelter (l985a). The
corporate rate has changed over the years, however, so Schwartz (1968) and
Nelson (1970) use time-series analysis to find price elasticities from 1.36 to
2.00, and from 1.03 to 1.18, respectively. Income elasticities may be less than
1orgreaterthan 1. The most recent and most thorough estimates are provided
by Clotfelter (l985a), who uses two different samples (an aggregate time-
series, and pooled observations ofasset classes overtime), two different after-
tax price variables (one based on aconstructed marginal tax rate and one based
on an average effective tax rate), and several different measures of income
(pretax income, post-tax income, or net cash flow). He obtains price elastici-
ties between 0.20 and 1.75, and income elasticities between 0.40 and 1.14.
As pointed out by Clotfelter, differences among these estimates are attrib-
utable directly to differences in the variables used to measure prices and in-
comes. For the after-tax price ofa gift at the margin, the conceptually correct
variable is 1 minus the statutory marginal rate. The aggregate or pooled data
·donot-supplya-singlemarginal-rate;however;Whenearly·work-bySchwartz
and later work by Clotfelter use the ratio of corporate taxes to corporate in-
come (the average effective tax rate) as an approximation ofthe correct mar-
ginal rate, they get high estimates of the price elasticity. Nelson attempts to
construct an estimate of the weighted-average marginal tax rate, and he gets226 Tax Policy Toward Art Museums
low price elasticities. When Clotfelter conducts complicated calculations of
the statutory rate bracket faced by each firm in each asset class in each year-
again to approximate the correct marginal rate-he gets price elasticities only
from 0.20 to 0.57, depending on other specifications.
Forincome elasticities, early work by Schwartz and laterwork by Clotfelter
again find similar distinctions based on the measure of income. The use of
after-tax income implies elasticities less than 1 (as low as 0.53), and the use
ofafter-tax cash flow implies elasticities greater than 1 (as great as 1.34).
These kinds ofdifferences make it difficult to conclude anything definitive
about the effect of taxes on corporate contributions to art museums. There is
no consensus about the best estimated price or income elasticities, so there
can be no certainty about predictions based on anyone set ofelasticities. For
this reason, no attempt is made here to simulate the effects ofthe Tax Reform
Act of 1986, as was done for changes to individual tax rates and giving. Clot-
felter (l985a) seems to prefer price and income elasticities of 0.4 and 1.1,
respectively, and he uses these values to find that the repeal of the corporate
tax would reduce gifts by 7.2 percent. Although the price of gifts would rise
by about 85 percent, the after-tax cash flow would increase by 17 percent,
nearly offsetting the price increase (p. 221). In the case ofthe 1986 act, both
effects work to reduce gifts: it reduced the statutory marginal tax rate (in-
creased the price of giving) and simultaneously increased corporate tax bur-
dens by $120 billion over 5 years. Still, the analysis is complicated by other
changes such as the reduction of individual tax burdens and the possibility
that corporations act on behalf of shareholders who can see through the cor-
porate veil.
8.4.4 The Estate and Gift Tax
Aside from brief intervals, 1862 to 1870 and 1898 to 1902, the federal
estate tax has been in operation continuously since 1916. Itwas initially levied
at rates from 1 to 10 percent, and during World War I from 2 to 25 percent,
with an exemption of$50,000. The current gift tax was enacted in 1932. The
estate and gift tax rules were modified several times until 1942, when the
exemption was set at $60,000 and the rates extended to 77 percent. This
$60,000 exemption was fixed in nominal terms for the next 34 years, with the
result that the number of taxable estates increased from 1.1 percent of all
deaths in 1942, to 6.5 percent ofall deaths in 1976 (Pechman 1987,350).
In 1976, the exemption was converted to a tax credit that was equivalent to
an exemption ofmore than $120,000. The top rate was reduced to 70 percent,
and the estate and gift taxes were unified. In 1981, the unified credit was set
to be increased in stages up to the current exemption equivalent of$600,000,
the top rate was reduced in stages to the current top rate of50 percent, and the
deduction for marital bequests was increased from 50 percent to the current
100 percent ofthe estate. As a consequence ofthese changes, taxable estates227 Don Fullerton
have fallen back from 6.5 percent of deaths in 1976 to 1.5 percent ofdeaths
in 1985. In relation to total federal budget receipts, the estate ad gift tax has
fallen from a peak of 2.3 percent to a current 0.9 percent (Pechman 1987,
370).
The gift tax represents a very small portion ofthis revenue, but its purpose
clearly is to prevent the erosion of the estate tax base that would be made
possible through inter vivos transfers to the same individuals. Under current
rules, each spouse can give up to $10,000 per year tax-free to each child or
other beneficiary, and excess gifts apply to the $600,000 lifetime exemption
of the unified estate and gift tax. Similarly, the "generation-skipping transfer
tax" is designed to prevent erosion of the estate tax base through trusts that
provide income for the lifetime of the next generation (the children), where
the remainder is given to the following generation (the grandchildren). Under
all ofthese taxes, charitable donations are fully deductible.29
In 1985, 30,500 estates were taxable. These estates were worth $32.7 bil-
lion, but exemptions and deductions reduced the taxable portion to $24.4 bil-
lion. The total charitable deduction was $4.5 billion, an amount somewhat
larger than corporate charitable deductions but still one-tenth the size ofindi-
vidual income tax deductions. The estate tax revenue after credits was $5.0
billion, one-fifth of the estate tax base. The great bulk ofthe wealth is in the
largest few estates, however. Estates over $5 million account for 2 percent of
taxable returns but 36 percent ofthe tax (Pechman 1987, 239).
While the estate tax is not a significant source of revenue, it still takes 40
percent ofthe taxable base for gross estates over $10 million. Thus the major
reason for the tax may be its redistributive effect, or perceived redistributive
effect. Bernheim (1987) has even suggested that the estate tax leads to a reduc-
tion in total tax revenue, by encouraging more inter vivos transfers of assets
to children whose income is then subject to lower personal marginal tax rates.
While charitable bequests are a small portion oftotal charitable giving, they
are a crucial source ofart for museums (see Richard N. Rosett, chap. 6 in this
volume). This difference is related to evidence that the distribution of chari-
table deductions under the estate tax is even more skewed than charitable de-
ductions under the income tax. Charitable bequests constitute less than 1 per-
cent ofsmall estates, but this fraction rises to 48 percent ofthe largest estates
(Clotfelter 1985a, 230). These large estates are more likely to give to mu-
seums. Detailed data are not available, but Clotfelter (p. 232) indicates that
bequests to religious organizations account for two-thirds of total charitable
bequests of small estates and less than 1 percent of total charitable bequests
... ..·29:·Deperiding·oriinedesifesoftli:edoriof;··arrarigemerifscari·oe·madetDsplifup··tli:e·cofittOl·df····
the assets, the income from the assets, and the remaining interests in the assets, through charitable
remainder trusts, pooled income funds, or charitable lead trusts. See Arthur Andersen (1987).
Although art may be left in the control of an heir for his or her lifetime before donation to a
museum, these trusts are most commonly associated with income-producing property.228 Tax Policy Toward Art Museums
for the largest estates; bequests to educational, scientific, and literary organi-
zations show no clear relation to estate size; and bequests to other charitable
organizations (including foundations) increase as a fraction ofestate size.
The largest estates provide most of the charitable bequests and give more
than proportionately to the arts, so the price ofgiving to art museums depends
on the top marginal rate under the estate tax even more than under the income
tax. As is not true under the income tax, however, appreciated property is
never subject to capital gains tax at the time ofdeath. Instead, the "basis" for
the heir is increased to the fair market value of the property at the time of
inheritance. Thus, the forgiveness of capital gains tax is not an additional
benefit ofdonation to charity, as it is under the income tax. The after-tax price
of giving to charity, rather than to an heir, is just 1 minus the estate tax rate.
The situation is more complicated under different alternatives, however, as
described by Boskin (1976). Ifthe alternative to giving property to charity at
death is to consume the proceeds during life, then the relative price does in-
volve the capital gains tax that would have to be paid upon sale. Or, if the
alternative to a charitable donation at death is a donation to the same charity
during life, the relative price may involve the personal income tax rate, the
capital gains rate, the estate tax rate, and the interest rate that can be earned
on funds retained until death. Nonetheless, most empirical studies ofthe price
elasticity simply use 1 minus the estate tax rate as the price of a charitable
bequest.30
Empirical work in this area finds that charitable bequests are related to the
after-tax price, the size ofthe estate, and the age and marital status at the time
ofdeath. Most studies find very large price elasticities for charitable bequests.
Interestingly enough, they tend to find that the price elasticity falls as the
estate size becomes larger. When Boskin (1976) uses 1969 estate tax returns,
for example, he finds that the elasticity with respect to estate size is 0.40 and
that the price elasticity falls from 2.53 for the smaller estates to 0.20 for the
largest estates. Using 157-59 returns, the price elasticity ranges from 1.8 for
the smallest to 0.94 for the largest. Feldstein (1977) finds that the price elas-
ticity ranges from 4.0 for the smallest estates to 0.3 for the largest estates. In
contrast, Barthold and Plotnick (1984) find that the after-tax price is not a
significant determinant ofcharitable bequests.
Finally, Clotfelter (1985a) uses more recent 1976 data, varies the functional
forms, and recalculates previous results. He finds high price elasticities, rang-
ing from 3.70 for the smallest estates (those with price greater than 0.8) to
1.77 for the largest estates (those with price less than 0.6). He also simulates
the effects of recent estate tax changes, using 1.6 for the price elasticity of
estates less than $1 million (and 0.4 for the elasticity with respect to estate
30. Similarly, when empirical work discussed in section 8.3.5 uses I minus the personal tax
rate, amended for the capital gains tax, it assumes that the alternative to the current gift is current
consumption. If the alternative to lifetime giving is donation at death, then the price in those
regressions would involve the estate tax.229 Don Fullerton
size). Because ofuncertainties about the estimated coefficients, he uses alter-
native values of 1.0 or 2.4 for the price elasticity of large estates. Results
suggest that the 1981 changes could reduce total charitable bequests by 34 to
52 percent, but could reduce charitable bequests ofthe very largest estates by
50 to 84 percent. As a consequence, ifdonations ofart are concentrated in the
largest estates, and if the price elasticity is as high as 2.4, then the 1981 re-
duction in the top marginal estate tax rate from 70 to 50 percent could have a
very major impact on bequests to art museums.
8.5 Conclusion
Although art museums do not pay any substantial taxes, they are greatly
affected by various U.S. tax rules. The individual receives a deduction for
donations ofart to museums, the estate gets a deduction for bequests, and the
corporation gets a deduction for charitable gifts. These deductions might be
viewed as the logical consequence of taxing a measure of income defined as
funds available for personal consumption, excluding funds given to a public
cause. Alternatively, they might be an explicit policy to encourage gifts.
Whatever the justification, when taxes raise the cost ofundertaking activities
that are not deductible, these provisions clearly lower the relative cost ofmak-
ing donations. In this sense, art museums receive an implicit subsidy.
Art museums also are not taxed on investment income or on some related
business activities. Again these provisions might be justified in a number of
ways, but the effect oftaxes is to raise the cost ofother private activities and
thus lower the relative cost ofmuseum activities.
The tax expenditure is defined as the amount that would have been collected
from museums if they had been fully taxed. In combination, this set of tax
provisions is found to have a tax expenditure that is larger than direct federal
expenditures on art museums in the United States. However, the amount of
this tax expenditure or implicit subsidy has been falling in recent years be-
cause of reductions in the marginal personal income tax rates at which indi-
viduals deduct gifts.
A review of the empirical literature reveals that individuals and corpora-
tions are indeed fairly responsive to the incentive inherent in this deductibility.
High-income taxpayers are found to be the most responsive to marginal tax
rate, and they also tend to give the largest amounts to the arts. Therefore, the
level ofthe top personal marginal tax rate is particularly important to art mu-
seums. Simulations here suggest that the personal marginal rate reduction in
the Tax Reform Act of1986 could greatly reduce gifts to the arts.
~-~~~~~~~Othercountriestend~t(J~have~smaller··implicittax~subsidies··butlargerdirect····
spending on the arts. What might be the advantages or disadvantages ofeach
approach?Ifthe primary justification for public aid is the educational benefits
of art museums, for example, then a government using the direct approach
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ifthe goal is to make art opportunities more accessible to a wider audience, it
might direct funds toward traveling exhibitions. A disadvantage is that art
funding is subjected to the political process.
The United States provides relatively more implicit aid. Deductibility is
available for gifts to art museums that may be used for purposes specified by
the donor rather than by the government. In effect, we seem to have decided
that the possible advantage of direct spending is outweighed by the need to
avoid undue political influence.
Appendix A
Price Elasticities and Simulation
In order to estimate price and income elasticities, researchers often assume
that charitable behavior is determined by:
(1)
where G is the amount of giving, P is the price, Y is income, and A is a
function ofother characteristics. In this case b is the price elasticity, as can be
confirmed by taking the derivative of G with respect to P: dG/dP =
bAPb-lYc = bG/P, so b = (dG/G)I(dP/P). The income elasticity is c =
(dG/G)/(dY/Y). In this particular functional form, these parameters are con-
stant across different prices and income levels (though giving is not). The next
step is to take the natural logarithm of(1) and run linear regressions on:
(2) In(G) = In(A) + b·ln(P) + dn(Y).
Since equation (2) relates the consumer's spending on gifts to the price of
gifts, it is essentially a downward-sloping demand curve. Giving falls when
the price rises, but it is common to refer to the absolute value ofthe elasticity
as a measure ofresponsiveness.
Ifthe data separate the amount ofcash gifts from the amount ofappreciated
property, then the after-tax price for total giving of the household is a
weighted average ofthe price for cash gifts and the price for property gifts:
(3) P = C(1 - t) + (1 - CHI - t - a . g]
where C is the fraction given in cash, t is the marginal tax rate for the deduc-
tion, a is the discounted ratio of appreciation to value, and g is the capital
gains tax rate. The two tax rates are equal under current law, so for our ex-
ample with the rate of 28 percent, equation (3) provides (1 - t - a
. g) = I - .28 - (.2)(.28) = .664 for the price of giving appreciated
property. Also, this price implies that the alternative to the gift is consump-
tion. Ifthe alternative is a bequest, the estate tax matters (Clotfelter I985b).231 Don Fullerton
Each household is typically assigned the average fraction given in cash for
its income group. The amount ofappreciation is not available, but Feldstein
and Clotfelter (1976) find that a = .5 provides the best fit for the data. Sub-
sequent researchers typically assume this ratio.
A major purpose of estimating the price and income elasticities for chari-
table giving is to measure the effect of changes in tax policy. Since the form
of equation (1) assumes that the elasticity is constant over a range of prices,
the estimates can be used to "predict" changes in gifts even for a large discrete
change in the after-tax price. Suppose that Go is the observed amount of giv-
ing, as determined by A(PO)byc, and that tax policy changes the price from Po
to Pl' The predicted new level of giving is Gl = A(P)bYc, but division im-
plies that (G/Go) (P/PO)b. Then multiplication by Go provides:
(4)
This equation "predicts" new gifts using only observations on old gifts, the
statutory change in tax rates, and existing estimates ofb.
Appendix B
The Cost ofCapital
For simplicity, suppose that a firm pays corporate tax at rate u on earnings
after deductions for economic depreciation at replacement cost. It faces a cer-
tain interest rate i and inflation rate 7T. It considers a hypothetical marginal
investment that must earn a nominal required after-tax rate of return r, the
discount rate. Suppose that the return c falls due to depreciation at rate 3, and
is discounted at rate r. The equilibrium condition is that the marginal one
dollar outlay must be matched by the present value ofafter-tax earnings (see
Hall and Jorgenson 1967):
1
00 c(1 - u)
(5) 1 = c(1 - u)e(7T-8)te- rt dt + uz = + uz,
o r-7T+3
where z is the present value ofdepreciation allowances at rate 3, discounted at
r - 7T. Thus, with economic depreciation at replacement cost, z = 3/




p =c=3= (J = uz) =3.==.
(1 - u) 1 - u
Regardless of the actual source offinance, the firm could always forgo the
investment and retire debt (or increase interest-bearing assets) instead, so the
discount rate is the interest cost ofthe funds. In other words, because ofarbi-232 Tax Policy Toward Art Museums
trage between this real investment and the interest rate alternative, these cost-
of-capital comparisons pertain even if the investment is actually financed by
equity ofthe taxable corporation orofthe exempt organization.
For a taxable firm, the alternative is to save i(l - u) on its debt (or to earn
i(1 - u] on interest-bearing assets), so r = i(l - u) and:
(7)
• 'IT
Ptaxable = I - ~.
For a nontaxable entity considering the same investment project, the re-
quired rate ofreturn that it can earn on other assets is r = i, the market inter-
est rate. However, u is zero, so:
(8) Pnontaxable - 'IT.
Thus, with no inflation, the cost ofcapital for the two types ofinvestors would
be identical. In fact, in this simple example with economic depreciation at
replacement cost, higher inflation causes the cost of capital for the taxable
firm to fall below that of the exempt firm. The taxable firm's cost ofcapital
and effective tax rate may be even lower ifit receives an investment credit or
depreciation that is more accelerated than economic allowances at replace-
ment cost. In the more general case, with historical cost depreciation and tax-
ation ofnominal capital gains, inflation might raise the cost ofcapital for the
taxable firm above that ofthe exempt firm.
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